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Abstract
Simple type theory is formulated for use with the generic theorem prover
Isabelle. This requires explicit type inference rules. There are function, prod-
uct, and subset types, which may be empty. Descriptions (the η-operator)
introduce the Axiom of Choice. Higher-order logic is obtained through re°ec-
tion between formulae and terms of type bool . Recursive types and functions
can be formally constructed.
Isabelle proof procedures are described. The logic appears suitable for
general mathematics as well as computational problems.
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1 Introduction
Isabelle is a theorem prover for various logics, including several ¯rst-order logics,
Martin-LÄof's Type Theory, and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory [30, 31]. Each new
logic is formalized within Isabelle's meta-logic. New types and constants express
the syntax of the logic, while new axioms express its inference rules.
The present formulation of simple type theory (also called higher-order logic)
may interest logicians. It also illustrates Isabelle applied to an area where hard
choices must be made. The simple theory of types is too simple; it can be enriched
in numerous ways, as hinted by Church [5]. The traditional formalization, with
implicit type constraints, goes beyond Isabelle's view of syntax. Isabelle supports
ML-style type inference with uni¯cation; the formulation o®ers a limited degree of
polymorphism.
There are several reasons for implementing higher-order logic in Isabelle.
Gordon and others have used higher-order logic, with great success, for hardware
veri¯cation [6, 14]. They have developed a theorem prover called hol, based on lcf.
Another implementation of higher-order logic is tps [2]. How well does Isabelle
perform against specialized systems like these?
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory [36] is intended as a foundation of mathematics, but
is inconvenient for formal proof | even set theorists use intuition and diagrams.
Yet set theory is the basis of the Z speci¯cation language [35]. Philippe NoÄel has
conducted extensive set theory proofs in Isabelle [25]. Type theory is also intended
as a foundation for mathematics, and seems nearly as powerful. How does it compare
with set theory as a practical formal language?
Isabelle's meta-logic is a fragment of Church's version of type theory [30]. It is
natural to ask whether the meta-logic can be formalized in itself. Actually, the object
version of higher-order logic has to be much larger than the meta-logic because it is
intended for expressing all kinds of mathematics. The meta-logic only has to express
other formal systems.
The Isabelle implementation is de¯nitely not intended for teaching Church's
notation. Here tps is the champion, with a special character set for Church's sub-
scripted Greek letters. However, most modern authors write x : α and α→ β rather
than xα and βα. Church's axiom system is now antiquated, largely dating back to
Principia Mathematica. There are improved formulations but most use the Hilbert
style. Natural deduction is far superior for automated proof.
Sections 2 and 3 of the paper introduce Isabelle and the theory of types. Sec-
tions 4 to 10 discusses some issues in the Isabelle formulation, while Section 11
presents the formulation itself. The remaining sections describe proof procedures
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and o®er some conclusions. The computer ¯le containing the rules is included as an
appendix.
2 Overview of Isabelle
Isabelle represents its object-logics within a fragment of intuitionistic higher-order
logic including implication, universal quanti¯ers, and equality [30]. The implication
φ =⇒ ψ means `φ implies ψ', and expresses logical entailment. The quanti¯cation∧
x . φ means `φ is true for all x', where x has a ¯xed type, and expresses generality
in object-rules and axiom schemes. The equality a ≡ b means `a equals b', and
expresses de¯nitions.
The meta-logic includes the typed λ-calculus, which is convenient for formalizing
the syntax of object-logics, particularly variable binding. Provisos of quanti¯er rules
(of the sort `x not free in the assumptions') are enforced by meta-level quanti¯cation.
Like in lcf [29], backwards proofs are developed using tactics and tacticals,
which are implemented using Standard ml. But an inference rule in lcf is a function
from the premises to the conclusion, while in Isabelle it is an axiom in the meta-logic
stating that the premises imply the conclusion.
Since Isabelle axioms are essentially Horn clauses, the proof techniques draw
ideas from prolog. Huet's higher-order uni¯cation procedure [18] takes account
of α, β, and η-conversions during uni¯cation. Higher-order uni¯cation can return
multiple or in¯nitely many results. While the general problem is undecidable, the
procedure works well in Isabelle.
3 A brief history of type theory
Bertrand Russell invented the theory of types to resolve the paradoxes in the foun-
dations of mathematics.
One pillar of type theory is that functions di®er from individuals. There are
also functions of functions, etc., giving a hierarchy of types. To start, there is a
type of individuals (Church's ι) and a type of propositions (Church's o). If α and
β are types then so is α → β, the type of functions from α to β. A statement is
meaningless unless it obeys the type constraints: a function of type α→ β can only
be applied an object of type α. The logical constants are functions over the type of
propositions. In ∀x and ∃x the variable x must range over some type.
Russell's other pillar was the vicious circle principle, which concerned statements
like `all propositions are either true or false' [37, page 37]. If this were itself a
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proposition then it would refer to itself, a possibly dangerous circularity. The vicious
circle principle forbade such `impredicative propositions' through a system of orders.
A statement about all propositions of order n was itself a proposition of order n+ 1.
Whitehead and Russell showed how this rami¯ed type theory resolved the paradoxes,
but it was too weak to justify classical mathematics. They were forced to assume
the Axiom of Reducibility, squashing the orders down to one.
Simple type theory remains when the vicious circle principle is abandoned. Al-
though sets must be introduced in a strict hierarchy, propositions need not be. The
idea of orders appears today in the universes of Martin-LÄof's Type Theory [22],
where propositions are represented by types. The terminology persists: simple type
theory is called higher-order logic because it permits unrestricted quanti¯cation over
propositions of all orders.
The main achievement of Church [5] is a precise formulation of the syntax. (GÄodel
calls the vague syntax in Principia `a considerable step backwards as compared with
Frege' [13, page 448].) Church formalizes syntax, including quanti¯ers, in the typed
λ-calculus. His technique is now standard in generic theorem proving.
See Hatcher [16] and GÄodel [13] for further discussion of the history of these type
theories, and Andrews [1] for the formal development.
4 Fundamental issues in type theory
The following sections discuss basic issues in type theory: subtypes, description op-
erators, empty types, polymorphism, and higher-order reasoning. Here, we consider
the semantics and syntax.
We begin with basic notation and conventions for syntactic variables:
• types are Greek letters α, β, γ, . . .
• bound variables are x, y, z
• terms are a, b, c, d, . . . ; the ordered pair of a and b is 〈a, b〉; the relation a : α
means `a has type α'
• formulae are P , Q, R, . . . ; the true formula is >; the false formula is ⊥
4.1 Types as sets
Type theory is intended as the foundation of mathematics, but it has a simple
interpretation in set theory. Types denote sets, abstractions denote set-theoretic
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functions, and the typing relation denotes set membership. The present formulation
retains this semantics. There is no clear alternative: most mathematical reasoning
involves sets.
Many theorem provers perform type checking with parsing, but Isabelle cannot
do this for its object-logics. Type errors are detected much later: during proofs.
Proofs must include explicit type checking using type inference rules, like in Martin-
LÄof's Type Theory. Type symbols appear as extra arguments to constants.
Ill-typed terms can be written. Their value can vary among models because it
is not determined by the axioms. There is no special `unde¯ned' value. Similarly,
an ill-typed formula has some truth value. If this seems unsatisfactory, observe that
a traditional theory of Peano arithmetic speci¯es no value for division by zero, yet
the term a/0 denotes some number in each model, for each a.
Of course, there are alternative semantics. Fourman and Scott [11, 33] can rea-
son about whether a/b exists, but their existence predicate involves some complexity.
Their logic has a topos semantics, which is a categorical generalization of set the-
ory. Martin-LÄof's Type Theory [22] has a constructive, operational semantics. An
ambitious type theory can even be based on classical sets: Borzyszkowski et al. for-
malize general products, some domain theory, and types of types [10]. If the present
logic seems pedestrian compared with these, remember that it claims to express the
Simple Theory of Types.
4.2 Variable binding and substitution
Isabelle has a typed λ-calculus at the meta-level to deal with operators, variable
binding, and substitution uniformly.1 All forms of variable binding | abstraction,
quanti¯ers, descriptions | are expressed through meta-level abstraction. Com-
pound expressions like fst(a) and P & Q are expressed through meta-level applica-
tion. Further details are discussed elsewhere [30]. It may be simpler to regard all
compound forms, variable-binding or not, as primitive. When a term is written as
b(x), this can be regarded as setting o® the occurrences of x, so that b(a) nearby
indicates substitution. In fact, b(x) is a meta-level application, and substitution
takes place by meta-level β-reduction.
Church represents syntax in the object-level typed λ-calculus. His formulation
de¯nes λ-abstraction and application, then uses these to express quanti¯ers and
descriptions.
Meta-abstraction works better than object-abstraction in Isabelle. It is also more
modular. With meta-abstraction always available, di®erent fragments of the logic
1This works like Martin-LÄof's system of arities [26].
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can be understood independently of its internal notion of function.
A meta-level function may not correspond to any object-level function. For
example, the pairing function is de¯ned for all values of all types. It is de¯ned over
the whole object-level domain. It cannot be an object-level function, but could be
represented by a family of object-level functions of various types. This must be
borne in mind when comparing the present formulation with Church's.
Notation for object-level functions. Abstraction is written λx : α . b(x). Ap-
plication is written with the explicit `apply' operator (`), as in f ` a. The apply
operator is not used in general discussions of simple type theory.
5 Subtypes
A subtype is a collection of the elements of a type that share some common prop-
erty. Typically, a subtype de¯nes an abstract type from a type of representations.
The abstract type contains just the elements that represent abstract objects. Any
predicate P (x) over a type α de¯nes a subtype {x : α . P (x)}. Subtypes usually
make type checking undecidable, for checking whether a belongs to {x : α . P (x)}
requires proving P (a).
Consider de¯ning the sum type α+β. The left injection of a can be represented
by the pair of abstractions
〈(λx : α . a = x), (λy : β .⊥)〉
while the right injection of b can be represented by
〈(λx : α .⊥), (λy : β . b = y)〉
If formulae are terms of type bool , both injections have type (α→ bool)×(β → bool).
The subtype containing just the injections is the sum type α + β.
Because a subtype may depend upon bound variables, we must consider in-
troducing dependent types: general products and sums. These cause no semantic
di±culties, but seem unnecessary (see also Dana Scott [33]). The term
λz : α . λy : {x : α . R(z, x)} . y
has no legal type. Its type could be
∏
z:α .{x : α.R(z, x)} → α if we added dependent
types. However
λz : α . ∃y : {x : α . R(z, x)} . P (y)
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has type α→ bool because the body of the abstraction is a formula.
Traditionally a term has a unique type, but each element of a subtype also
belongs to its parent type. GÄodel [13, page 466] describes uniqueness of types as a
suspect principle, noting that it precludes reasoning about types. Such reasoning
is a necessity for Isabelle. Allowing types to overlap causes no di±culty in the
set-theoretic semantics.
Gordon's hol has a di®erent treatment of subtypes (see Melham [23]). To keep
uniqueness of types and decidable type checking, conversion functions distinguish
elements of a subtype from elements of the parent type. Determining that the
conversion functions are applied correctly still requires theorem proving. Subtypes
are de¯ned by top-level commands, so there is no question of dependent types.
Subtypes must be non-empty.
6 Descriptions
Descriptions, present in type theory from the beginning, name an object by a de¯n-
ing property. The unique description ιx : α . P (x) means `the x satisfying P (x)'.
For example,
√
a is ιx : nat . x2 = a. The inference rule veri¯es that there exists a
unique value that satis¯es P (x):
∃x : α . P (x) & (∀y : α . P (y)→ y = x)
P (ιx : α . P (x))
Descriptions can also embody the Axiom of Choice. Hilbert's ²-operator, written
²x : α . P (x), means `some x satisfying P (x)'. The rule drops the requirement of
uniqueness.
∃x : α . P (x)
P (²x : α . P (x))
Replacing the premise ∃x : α . P (x) by the two premises a : α and P (a) would
impose the stronger requirement (especially in classical logic) of exhibiting the term
a.
Gordon's hol uses Hilbert's ²-operator, while Church [5] formalizes both forms
of description. See Leisenring [21] for a full discussion of Hilbert's ²-operator.
6.1 Descriptions in Principia Mathematica
Whitehead and Russell (in Chapter III of Principia) argue that descriptions are
meaningless by themselves. They give translations to eliminate descriptions from
statements. In their view The author of Waverley was a poet means Waverley was
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written by some poet, not that Sir Walter Scott was a poet. This is because if The
author of Waverley denotes Sir Walter Scott, then Scott is the author of Waverley
means the same as Scott is Scott, which cannot be intended. Girard calls this
the question of sense vs denotation [12]. The question applies broadly, not just to
descriptions: does 2 + 2 = 4 mean simply 4 = 4?
If there is no object meeting the description, its meaning is problematical. To
Whitehead and Russell, a statement like The present King of France is bald is simply
false, while the meaning of The present King of France is not bald depends upon
the scope of the not.
The modern view is that a description denotes some object satisfying the given
property, if there is one. Otherwise it is unde¯ned | however we understand this.
6.2 The Axiom of Choice and classical logic
In higher-order logic, the Axiom of Choice implies the excluded middle. The argu-
ment, due to Diaconescu, is sketched by D. Scott [33]. Let two be the type whose
values are 0 and 1. To derive P ∨ ¬P for some formula P , de¯ne type set as the
following subtype of two → bool :
set ≡ {q : two → bool . ∃x : two . q(x) & ((∀x : two . q(x))↔ P )}
Note that q0 and q1 belong to type set , where
q0 ≡ λx : two . (x = 0) ∨ P
q1 ≡ λx : two . (x = 1) ∨ P
Informally, q0 and q1 correspond to the sets {0, 1?} and {1, 0?}, where 0? and 1? are
included just if P holds. Each element of set contains some x : two. By the Axiom
of Choice (Hilbert's ²-operator) there is a corresponding function f : set → two:
f ≡ λq : set . ²x : two . q(x)
Whether f(q0) = f(q1) holds or not is decidable, for it is an equality between natural
numbers. And this equality decides P :
• If f(q0) = f(q1) then P . By the rule for descriptions, both q0(f(q0)) and
q1(f(q1)) hold, namely (f(q0) = 0) ∨ P and (f(q1) = 1) ∨ P . There are four
subcases, of which three imply P and one implies 0 = 1.
• If f(q0) 6= f(q1) then ¬P . Assuming that P holds implies q0 = λx : two .> =
q1, and so f(q0) = f(q1), contradiction.
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7 Empty types
Traditional formulations of higher-order logic require that all types are non-empty.
This hardly matters for Church, who has only two basic types (propositions and
individuals). With many basic types, the requirement becomes unnatural. If the
subtype {x : α . P (x)} depends on free variables, it could sometimes be empty.
Empty types require careful formulation of quanti¯ers and descriptions.
Isabelle's meta-logic uses implicit type checking and does not admit empty meta-
types. Empty types are not needed at the meta-level.
7.1 Church's formulation of quanti¯ers
Church postulates a supply of variables xα, yα, zα, . . . for each type α. Typical
quanti¯er rules are (with the usual variable restrictions)
P (xα)
∀xα . P (xα) ∀-intr
∀xα . P (xα)
P (aα)
∀-elim
P (aα)
∃xα . P (xα) ∃-intr
∃xα . P (xα)
[P (xα)]
Q
Q
∃-elim
In the ∀-intr rule xα is a variable of type α. In the ∀-elim rule, aα is any term of
type α, even a variable. This rule and ∃-intr are unsound if α is empty, with many
false consequences:
¬(∀xα .⊥) ∃xα .> (∀xα . P (xα))→ (∃xα . P (xα))
These look like trivial theorems of ¯rst-order logic, but a ¯rst-order domain may
not be empty.
7.2 Quanti¯er rules admitting empty types
Explicit type checking admits empty types | almost by accident. The quanti¯er
rules are
[x : α]
P (x)
∀x : α . P (x) ∀-intr
∀x : α . P (x) a : α
P (a)
∀-elim
P (a) a : α
∃x : α . P (x) ∃-intr
∃x : α . P (x) [x : α, P (x)]
Q
Q
∃-elim
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There is no supply of typed variables; instead, ∀-intr and ∃-elim discharge the as-
sumption x : α. The rules ∀-elim and ∃-intr demand a proof of a : α; if a is some
variable y, the proof will depend on the assumption y : α. If there is no closed term
of type α then ∃x : α .> has no proof, but ∀y : α . ∃x : α .> does:
> [y : α]
∃x : α .>
∀y : α . ∃x : α .>
7.3 Descriptions and empty types
Because it is always de¯ned, Hilbert's ²-operator gives every type α the element
²x : α . >. Another form of description, the η-operator, permits empty types. If
there is no x : α satisfying P (x) then ηx : α .P (x) is undefined | its value and type
are unspeci¯ed. This typing rule for descriptions makes type checking undecidable.
Hilbert's ²-operator can express the quanti¯ers: for example, ∃x : α . P (x) as
P (²x : α . P (x)). This does not work with the η-operator, for if ∃x : α . P (x) is false
then P (ηx : α . P (x)) is meaningless.
The ²-operator can be de¯ned through the η-operator if α is non-empty, because
Q → ∃x : α . P (x) implies ∃x : α . Q → P (x) under classical logic.2 Putting
∃y : α . P (y) for Q, the body of the η can always be satis¯ed:
²x : α . P (x) ≡ ηx : α . (∃y : α . P (y))→ P (x)
7.4 Alternative formulations
The above quanti¯er and description rules are adopted for the present formulation
of simple type theory. Here are two other ways | both based on topos theory | of
admitting empty types.
• Fourman [11] and Dana Scott [33] formalize the notion of existence: a term
can have a valid type and yet be unde¯ned. A type is empty if it has no de¯ned
elements. The ∀-elimination rule can only be applied to a de¯ned term. The
description ιx : α . P (x) exists only if P (x) is satis¯ed by a unique value, but
always has type α.
• Lambek and P. J. Scott [20, page 130] present quanti¯er rules that maintain
a list of the typed variables on which the conclusion depends.
2Classical logic obtains by Diaconescu's argument, for η implies the Axiom of Choice.
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8 Polymorphism
The `typical ambiguity' in Principia is a form of polymorphism where type symbols
in expressions are simply not shown. Type checking in ml is a formal version of
the same thing: types are inferred but not shown. Isabelle does not (at present)
allow any hiding of syntax. This calls for another kind of polymorphism, where
certain constants have no type symbols at all. Let us consider how to minimize type
symbols in elements of function, product, and sum types. To do this safely, we must
remember the semantics.
8.1 Functions
The notation for abstraction could have type symbols for the function's domain and
range:
λα,βx . b(x) : α→ β
where b(x) : β for x : α.
The type symbol α is essential. Functions like λx . 0 and λx . x cannot be
interpreted as sets without specifying the set of values x may take. In domain
theory a function can be de¯ned over the universal domain. But we are in set
theory, where an operation `on everything' is not a function. An element of α→ β
may (hereditarily) contain all the elements of α and β, so these must be sets.
The type symbol β is super°uous, however, by set theory's Axiom of Replace-
ment. If α denotes a set then {b(x) | x : α} is also a set. Deleting β improves the
notation:
λx : α . b(x) : α→ β
Martin-LÄof's Type Theory has polymorphic functions like λx.x, but its semantics
is operational: its functions are algorithms, not graphs. Nor can we omit the type
symbols as a syntactic convenience, hoping they could be replaced in principle.
Anne Salvesen [32] presents proofs in Martin-LÄof's Type Theory that fail when type
symbols are added. Her arguments are general, and should apply here as well.
Note that only the `contravariant' aspect of functions | the domain of applica-
tion | requires a type label. Product and sum types do not need any type labels.
8.2 Products
For products, a pairing constructor with type symbols is
Pairα,β(a)(b) : α× β (a : α, b : β)
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This could abbreviate the abstraction
λx : α . λy : β . (x = a) & (y = b) : α→ β → bool
which contains the type symbols α and β. But pairs need not carry type symbols.
In set theory, pairs formed by the operation 〈a, b〉 = {{a}, {a, b}} do not depend on
what sets contain a and b. The Isabelle formulation includes a polymorphic pairing
operator 〈a, b〉.
Many other authors, for various reasons, take pairing as a primitive of the typed
λ-calculus [12, 20, 33].
8.3 Sums
The disjoint sum has left and right injections:
Inlα,β(a) : α + β (a : α)
Inrα,β(b) : α + β (b : β)
The type symbols are again unnecessary. In set theory, the injections Inl(a) =
〈{a}, ∅〉 and Inr(b) = 〈∅, {b}〉 depend only on the values of a and b, not on the sets
that contain them.
In the current version of the logic, a monomorphic (type labelled) disjoint sum
is derived as shown in Section 5. Taking polymorphic injections as primitive seems
to be needless extra complexity, for it does not greatly improve the notation.
8.4 Comparison with other type systems
The Edinburgh Logical Framework, a type theory for representing formal systems,
can express the implicit type checking of Church's higher-order logic [15]. In this
case all constants are fully decorated with type symbols, and terms contain much
redundant type information.
Gordon's hol system, like lcf, uses polymorphic type checking. Its type vari-
ables, written *, **, etc., are syntactic variables ranging over types. The identity
combinator I might have the polymorphic type
I : * -> *
Because a constant's type is part of its name, the hol constant I stands for a family
of constants Iα, satisfying the schematic typing
Iα : α→ α
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For example, I(I) abbreviates I(α→α)→(α→α)(Iα→α). This is not self-application: it
involves two di®erent instances of I.
Under the set-theoretic semantics, an identity function on all types could not
exist. Coquand [8] has shown that polymorphic higher-order logic is inconsistent.
A constant like Iα : α → α is here called monomorphic (following Salvesen [32])
because of its type label.
9 Higher-order reasoning
Quanti¯cation over propositions is what makes simple type theory `higher-order'.
First-order logic allows quanti¯cation over individuals; second-order logic allows
quanti¯cation over properties of individuals; third-order logic allows quanti¯cation
over properties of properties of individuals; and so forth. Higher-order (or ω-order)
logic allows all these quanti¯cations. A formula is simply a term of type bool .
The logic programming language λProlog, though based on higher-order logic,
forbids quanti¯cation over bool [24]. So it is really ¯rst-order logic extended with
typed λ-expressions. The meta-logic of Isabelle avoids quanti¯cation over bool to
simplify the theory, but this restriction is not enforced.
Quanti¯cation over propositions permits many di®erent formulations of higher-
order logic. Absurdity (⊥) is de¯nable as ∀p : bool . p, the proposition that implies
all propositions. Conjunction and disjunction are de¯nable by
P &Q ≡ ∀r : bool . (P → (Q→ r))→ r
P ∨Q ≡ ∀r : bool . (P → r)→ ((Q→ r)→ r)
Andrews [1] presents a formulation based on equality. For example, the universal
quanti¯er is de¯ned in terms of truth (>) as
∀x : α . P (x) ≡ (λx : α . P (x)) = (λx : α .>)
Representing formulae by terms of type bool is inconvenient in Isabelle. Explicit
type inference (to ensure that all theorems have type bool) encumbers proofs. Type
checking can be minimized by formulating each rule such that the conclusion is
well-typed provided its premises are. Then type checking only takes place when
assumptions are discharged. In a trial implementation, even this much checking was
ine±cient.
Now formulae are a separate syntactic class. The present formulation de¯nes
¯rst-order logic. It then adds reflection | isomorphisms between formulae and
terms of type bool | to obtain higher-order logic.
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• term(P ) is a term (of type bool) if P is a formula
• form(b) is a formula if b is a term
A predicate (or class) on α is just a function of type α→ bool . Class formation is
λ-abstraction over a formula, while the membership predicate is function application.
Let us introduce some class-theoretic notation:
{|x : α . P (x)|} ≡ λx : α . term(P (x))
a ∈ S ≡ form(S ` a)
Class theory is the main vehicle for mathematical reasoning in Principia.
The higher-order logic of Fourman and D. Scott [11, 33] also distinguishes be-
tween terms and formulae. The primitive types are products and powersets; func-
tions are represented by their graphs, like in set theory. Re°ection functions can be
de¯ned through class abstraction and the membership predicate: abstraction creates
a class (a term) from a formula, while membership in a class is a formula.
10 Recursive data types
Recursive types, like the natural numbers, lists, and trees, are an active research
area. The wellordering types of Martin-LÄof's Type Theory are general trans¯nite
trees [22]. The Nuprl system, although largely based on Martin-LÄof, uses positive
recursive type de¯nitions [7]. Boyer and Moore's `shell principle' introduces recursive
structures [4]. lcf can de¯ne recursive types using domain theory [29]. Recursive
types can also be constructed in simple type theory.
The natural numbers can be constructed in various ways, assuming an Axiom of
In¯nity. In Principia, the number 2 is the class of all pairs of some type α. In Church,
2 is λf : α→ α.λx : α.f(fx). Both de¯nitions are cumbersome and entail di®erent
types of natural numbers for each type α. The Isabelle formulation postulates a
type nat of natural numbers satisfying induction and primitive recursion.
Melham [23] describes one treatment of recursive types, de¯ning lists in terms
of natural numbers, and trees in terms of lists. He has implemented this in Gor-
don's hol system, which uses Church's logic.
The Isabelle formulation uses a di®erent treatment inspired by Huet [19]. For a
given set of constructors it involves two steps:
1. Find a type rich enough to represent all possible constructions.
2. Restrict to the subtype inductively generated by the constructors.
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Let us de¯ne list(α), the type of lists over α. The representing type is nat×α→
bool , where the list [x0, x1, . . . , xn] is represented by the class of pairs
{|〈0, x0〉, 〈1, x1〉, . . . , 〈n, xn〉|}
The constructors are nilα and consα(a, l). (They must be labelled with type α
because classes have type labels.) The empty list is represented by the empty class.
To put an element in front of a list, consα(a, l) increments m in all pairs 〈m,x〉 in l,
then adds the pair 〈0, a〉.
nilα ≡ {|u : nat × α .⊥|}
consα(a, l) ≡ {|u : nat × α . u = 〈0, a〉
∨ (∃m : nat . ∃x : α . 〈m,x〉 ∈ l & u = 〈Succ(m), x〉)|}
The representing type includes many non-lists. Tarski's theorem (see Huet [19]),
which asserts that every monotone function over a complete lattice has a least ¯xed
point, can be used to de¯ne the subtype of lists. The monotone function takes a
class F of lists and returns the class of all lists obtained by a further application of
the constructors:
{|l : nat × α→ bool . l = nilα
∨ (∃x : α . ∃l′ : nat × α→ bool . l′ ∈ F & l = consα(x, l′))|}
Trees with labelled edges can also be represented by classes of pairs. For lists,
the number in each pair gives the position of an element. The position of an element
in a tree can be given by a list of edges. If the trees have countable branching, the
representing type could be list(nat)× α. Trees are sometimes represented like this
in set theory.
Tarski's theorem also handles recursively de¯ned classes. For example, the re-
°exive/transitive closure of the relation R is inductively generated from the identity
relation by composition with R. This too is the least ¯xed point of a monotone
function.
11 The formulation of simple type theory
Because of type inference there are two forms of judgement: `formula P is true',
written simply P , and `term a has type α', written a : α. Type assertions cannot be
combined by logical connectives | which would not be in the spirit of type theory
| because a : α is not a formula.
Appendix A is the Isabelle rule ¯le, including a few uninteresting rules omitted
below.
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11.1 Equality
The formula a =α b means that a and b are equal and have type α. There is no deep
reason for having a typed equality relation. A proof that a equals b must involve
showing that a and b have some type α, and this type information could be useful
later.3
The re°exivity, symmetry, and substitution rules are
a : α
a =α a
a =α b
b =α a
a =α b P (b)
P (a)
The type information can be extracted. If a = b then both terms have the
relevant type.
a =α b
a : α
a =α b
b : α
11.2 Types
Functions
These rules for abstraction and application are typical of type inference systems:
see Chapter 15 of Hindley and Seldin [17]. Applications are written with an explicit
operator: f ` a.
[x : α]
b(x) : β
(λx : α . b(x)) : α→ β
f : α→ β a : α
f ` a : β
We have β and η-conversion:
a : α
[x : α]
b(x) : β
(λx : α . b(x)) ` a =β b(a)
f : α→ β
λx : α . f ` x =α→β f
In η-conversion, variable x may not be free in f . All rules that discharge the as-
sumption x : α are subject to the proviso that x is not free in the conclusion or
other assumptions. This will be taken for granted below.
Finally, there is a rule for the construction of equal abstractions. It does not
follow from the substitution rule above because x is bound in the conclusion.
[x : α]
b(x) =β c(x)
(λx : α . b(x)) =α→β (λx : α . c(x))
3In Martin-LÄof's Type Theory, equality can only be understood with respect to some type, so
the relation is typed for semantic reasons.
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Products
The pair of a and b is written 〈a, b〉; the projections are fst and snd. These constants
contain no type symbols.
Type assignment rules for pairing and the projections are
a : α b : β
〈a, b〉 : α× β
p : α× β
fst(p) : α
p : α× β
snd(p) : β
Conversion (equality) rules for pairing and the projections are
a : α b : β
fst(〈a, b〉) =α a
a : α b : β
snd(〈a, b〉) =β b
The elimination rule for products resembles a rule of Martin-LÄof's Type Theory:
p : α× β [x : α, y : β]
Q(〈x, y〉)
Q(p)
It implies 〈fst(p), snd(p)〉 =α×β p for p : α× β.
Subtypes
The type checking of subtypes involves the truth of P (a) and is therefore undecid-
able.
a : α P (a)
a : {x : α . P (x)}
The elimination rules say that if a : {x : α . P (x)} then a : α and P (a).
a : {x : α . P (x)}
a : α
a : {x : α . P (x)}
P (a)
Natural numbers
The type of natural numbers is called nat . The Axiom of In¯nity is expressed in
the most convenient form: through the existence of functions de¯ned by primitive
recursion.
The typing rules for 0 and successor are
0 : nat
a : nat
Succ(a) : nat
The typing rule for rec is
a : nat b : β
[x : nat , y : β]
c(x, y) : β
rec(a, b, xy . c(x, y)) : β
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The operator rec(a, b, xy . c(x, y)), where x and y are bound in c(x, y), expresses
primitive recursion. In the meta-level typed λ-calculus c is a function, so rec(a, b, xy.
c(x, y)) will henceforth be abbreviated to rec(a, b, c). The conversion rules for rec
are
b : β
[x : nat , y : β]
c(x, y) : β
rec(0, b, c) =β b
a : nat b : β
[x : nat , y : β]
c(x, y) : β
rec(Succ(a), b, c) =β c(a, rec(a, b, c))
Because rec binds variables, it requires its own substitution rule:
a =nat d b =β e
[x : nat , y : β]
c(x, y) =β f(x, y)
rec(a, b, c) =β rec(d, e, f)
The mathematical induction rule is
a : nat Q(0)
[x : nat , Q(x)]
Q(Succ(x))
Q(a)
11.3 Logic
Implication and universal quanti¯cation are taken as primitive; the other logical
constants are de¯ned through them.
The rules for implication are
[P ]
Q
P → Q
P → Q P
Q
The rules for universal quanti¯cation are
[x : α]
P (x)
∀x : α . P (x)
∀x : α . P (x) a : α
P (a)
The following rule gives classical logic (which follows anyway from the Axiom of
Choice).
[¬P ]
P
P
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Re°ection
The operator term(P ) maps a formula to a term of type bool , while form(a) maps
such a term to a formula. Since there is no way to decide whether a formula is true
or false, term(P ) is non-constructive. The truth value of form(a) is speci¯ed only
where a has type bool .
The typing rule says that term(P ) has type bool , even if P is ill-typed!
term(P ) : bool
Isomorphism rules state that term and form preserve truth:
a : bool
term(form(a)) =bool a
P
form(term(P ))
form(term(P ))
P
Although form(a) is syntactically a formula for all terms a, it preserves truth only
if a has type bool .
Also, term and form preserve equivalence:
[P ]
Q
[Q]
P
term(P ) =bool term(Q)
The analogous property for form | that a =bool b and form(b) imply form(a) |
follows by substitution.
De¯nitions of other connectives
These de¯nitions of other connectives yield their usual properties. The terms False
and True have type bool ; the absurdity formula (⊥) is form(False).
False ≡ term(∀p : bool . form(p))
True ≡ term(∀p : bool . form(p)→ form(p))
P &Q ≡ ∀r : bool . (P → Q→ form(r))→ form(r)
P ∨Q ≡ ∀r : bool . (P → form(r))→ (Q→ form(r))→ form(r)
∃x : α . P (x) ≡ ∀r : bool . (∀x : α . P (x)→ form(r))→ form(r)
¬P ≡ (P → form(False))
P ↔ Q ≡ (P → Q) & (Q→ P )
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Descriptions
The η-operator is adopted, which assumes an Axiom of Choice and is only de¯ned
if some suitable object exists.
∃x : α . P (x)
(ηx : α . P (x)) : α
∃x : α . P (x)
P (ηx : α . P (x))
Two descriptions are equal if they are de¯ned and the formulae are equivalent.
The second premise ensures that the description is de¯ned.
[x : α]
P (x)↔ Q(x) ∃x : α . P (x)
(ηx : α . P (x)) =α (ηx : α . Q(x))
11.4 De¯nitions of types
These include the empty type void , the singleton type unit , and the union type
α + β.
void ≡ {p : bool . form(False)} unit ≡ {p : bool . p =bool True}
The sum type consists of all left injections and right injections.
α + β ≡ {w : (α→ bool)× (β → bool). (∃x : α . w = Inl(α, β, x))
∨ (∃y : β . w = Inr(α, β, y))}
Injections are de¯ned in a standard way as pairs of classes [33].4
Inl(α, β, a) ≡ 〈λx : α . term(a =α x), λy : β . False〉
Inr(α, β, b) ≡ 〈λx : α . False, λy : β . term(b =β y)〉
The operator when(α, β, γ, p, c, d) performs case analysis on a sum type, where c
and d are meta-level functions.5
when(α, β, γ, p, c, d) ≡ ηz : γ. (∀x : α . p =α+β Inl(α, β, x)→ z =γ c(x))
& (∀y : β . p =α+β Inr(α, β, y)→ z =γ d(y))
These operators have type labels because they are de¯ned by terms containing type
symbols. All variables on the right side in a de¯nition must be present on the left.
Basic laws like whenα,β,γ(Inlα,β(a), c, d) = c(a) are proved in the Isabelle theory.
The operator is computable despite being de¯ned by description.
4The de¯nition of α+ β used by Melham [23] does not work if either type is empty.
5Conventional notation is whenα,β,γ(p, x . c(x), y . d(y)), where x and y are bound variables.
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11.5 Class Theory
Class theory includes the relations membership and subclass and the operations
union, intersection, and powerset. Union and intersection are also de¯ned for a class
of classes. The class abstraction {|x : α . P (x)|} abbreviates λx : α . term(P (x)).
Operators de¯ned by class abstraction have the type label α as an extra argument,
so none of these are in¯x operators in Isabelle's concrete syntax.
a ∈ S ≡ form(S ` a)
S ⊆α T ≡ ∀z : α . z ∈ S → z ∈ T
S ∪α T ≡ {|z : α . z ∈ S ∨ z ∈ T |}
S ∩α T ≡ {|z : α . z ∈ S & z ∈ T |}⋃
α F ≡ {|z : α . ∃S : α→ bool . S ∈ F & z ∈ S)|}⋂
α F ≡ {|z : α . ∀S : α→ bool . S ∈ F → z ∈ S)|}
Pα(S) ≡ {|T : α . T ⊆α S|}
12 Sample proofs in Isabelle
A logic is traditionally illustrated by sample proofs. Theorems proved using Isabelle
include basic facts, lemmas used in proof procedures, Tarski's Theorem, and well-
founded recursion. Proof procedures exist for ¯rst-order logic, rewriting, and class
theory.
12.1 Simple proof procedures
The rewriting package is based on the one for Martin-LÄof's Type Theory, as are
the sample proofs in elementary number theory. Using rewriting and induction,
arithmetic is developed up to the theorem a mod b+ (a/b)× b = a.
Re°ection works well in higher-order reasoning. Natural deduction rules for the
logical constants are easily derived from their higher-order de¯nitions. A standard
example of higher-order logic is Cantor's Theorem that every set has more subsets
than elements, which can be expressed as follows:
¬
(
∃g : α→ (α→ bool) . ∀f : α→ bool . ∃j : α . f = g ` j
)
(There is no onto function from α to α → bool .) While tps [2] can prove Cantor's
Theorem automatically, Isabelle must be guided towards the proof.
The proof procedures for ¯rst-order logic work directly with the natural deduc-
tion rules, as sketched in Chapter 2 of my book [29]. Although none of the procedures
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is complete or fast, they can prove many examples automatically:(
∃y : α.∀x : α.J(y, x)↔ ¬J(x, x)
)
→ ¬
(
∀x : α.∃y : α.∀z : α.J(z, y)↔ ¬J(z, x)
)
Similar proof procedures for class theory reason about unions, intersections, sub-
sets, etc. This example is proved automatically:
F : (α→ bool)→ bool G : (α→ bool)→ bool⋂
α(F ∪G) = (
⋂
α F ) ∩ (
⋂
αG)
Classes are also used to construct a type of lists and derive structural induction.
12.2 Well-founded induction and recursion
Well-founded recursion is a general method of de¯ning total recursive functions,
while well-founded induction reasons about functions so de¯ned. These principles,
which hold for every well-founded relation, play a central role in the Boyer/Moore
logic [4]. They have been derived using Isabelle.
Given a relation R : α × α → bool , let us write y R x instead of 〈y, x〉 ∈ R and
abbreviate `R is well-founded' as wfα(R). Classically, R is well-founded if there are
no in¯nite descending chains · · ·x3 R x2 R x1 R x0. The following de¯nition is more
convenient:
wfα(R) ≡
(
∀x : α . (∀y : α . y R x→ y ∈ S)→ x ∈ S
)
→ (∀x : α . x ∈ S)
This easily yields well-founded induction:
wfα(R) a : α
[x : α]
∀y : α . y R x→ y ∈ P (x)
P (a)
A recursive function f is well-founded along R if f(x) depends only on f(y) such
that yRx. This condition can be stated using subtypes. Type αRx is the restriction
of α to predecessors of x under R.
αRx ≡ {y : α . y R x}
The body of the recursive function has the form H(x, f) where x : α is the
argument and f : αRx → β handles recursive calls. Type checking ensures that f is
only called below x. The resulting recursive function is applied to argument a by
wfrecα,β(R,H, a).
wfα(R) R : α× α→ bool a : α
[x : α, f : αRx → β]
H(x, f) : β
wfrecα,β(R,H, a) : β
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Under the same premises, wfrec satis¯es the recursion equation
wfrecα,β(R,H, a) =β H(a, λx : αRa . wfrecα,β(R,H, x))
Some observations: The variables x and f are subject to the usual `not free in'
conditions. The abstraction λx : αRa . wfrecα,β(R,H, x) restricts the function to
arguments below a. Here H is a meta-level function (wfrec binds variables); if we
had dependent types, H could be an object-function of type
∏
x:α(αRx → β)→ β.
De¯ned by a description, wfrec takes the union of all graphs of functions that
satisfy the recursion equation below some x : α. Its typing rule holds because this
union forms the graph of a function on α. Observe how type checking can involve
substantial proof. With the help of a few extra lemmas, the equality rule is then
proved.
This work follows Suppes's treatment of trans¯nite recursion in set theory [36].
Operator wfrec is de¯ned once and for all, and its properties proved, for all well-
founded relations in the logic. It is far stronger than my work in Martin-LÄof's Type
Theory [28], which considers certain ways of constructing well-founded relations and
their corresponding recursion operators.
13 Conclusions
Programs are typically veri¯ed within a special logic of computation. Although sev-
eral such logics have been successful, they sometimes restrict abstract mathematical
reasoning | needed even for computational proofs.
• The Logic for Computable Functions (lcf) embeds a typed λ-calculus, where
types denote domains, into ¯rst-order logic [29]. lcf is good for reasoning
about nonterminating processes, but termination proofs can become a chore
(in my opinion [27]). The restriction to domains and continuous functions has
serious consequences [34].
• Martin-LÄof's Type Theory is based on computation [22, 26]. By the inter-
pretation of propositions-as-types, a type can express a complete program
speci¯cation. Developments and applications are proceeding rapidly [3]. How-
ever, the theory does not admit classical set-theoretic arguments. Unwanted
proof objects in types cause complications [32].
• Boyer and Moore use quanti¯er-free ¯rst-order logic with well-founded induc-
tion and recursion [4]. Although this combination gives unique simplicity and
power, it is hard to do without quanti¯ers.
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Simple type theory may be suitable for reasoning about computation. It o®ers a
rich collection of computable functions, including general recursive and higher-order
functions, but it is not restricted to computable functions. Subtypes and classes
can express program speci¯cations. The main question is how to recognize when a
function is computable.
Some people will wonder whether classical logic is appropriate. Why not use
intuitionistic higher-order logic instead? Simply remove the double-negation law and
the Axiom of Choice (replacing the η-operator by ι). Although I have an interest
in constructive logic, this suggestion requires a stronger argument. Intuitionism is
a deep and evolving subject. There is little agreement about whether intuitionistic
higher-order logic, with its impredicative quanti¯cation, is constructive.
The Calculus of Constructions, by Coquand and Huet [9], is also intended for
reasoning about programs. In use it is very like simple type theory: the Isabelle
proof of Tarski's theorem follows Huet's [19]. However, it interprets propositions-
as-types and has a clear notion of computation. Experiments with the Calculus and
the Isabelle formulation of type theory will make an interesting comparison.
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A Appendix: The Isabelle Rule File
(* Title: HOL/ruleshell
Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
Copyright 1989 University of Cambridge
Rules of Higher-order Logic (Type Theory)
!!!After updating, rebuild ".rules.ML" by calling make-rulenames!!!
*)
signature HOL_RULE =
sig
structure Thm : THM
val sign: Thm.Sign.sg
val thy: Thm.theory
(*INSERT-RULESIG -- file produced by make-rulenames*)
end;
functor HOL_RuleFun (structure HOL_Syntax: HOL_SYNTAX and Thm: THM
sharing HOL_Syntax.Syntax = Thm.Sign.Syntax) : HOL_RULE =
struct
structure Thm = Thm;
val thy = Thm.enrich_theory Thm.pure_thy "HOL"
(["term","form","type"], HOL_Syntax.const_decs, HOL_Syntax.syn)
[
(*** Equality ***)
("refl", "[| a: A |] ==> [| [ a = a : A ] |]"),
("sym", "[| [ a = b : A ] |] ==> [| [ b = a : A ] |]"),
(*Equal terms are well typed -- all rules must enforce this! *)
("eq_type1", "[| [ a = b : A ] |] ==> [| a: A |]" ),
("eq_type2", "[| [ a = b : A ] |] ==> [| b: A |]" ),
("subst",
"[| [ a = c : A ] |] ==> [| P(c) |] ==> [| P(a) |]"),
(*** TYPES ***)
(** Functions **)
("Lambda_type",
"(!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| b(x) : B |]) ==> \
\ [| lam x:A. b(x) : A->B |]" ),
("Lambda_congr",
"(!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| [ b(x) = c(x) : B ] |]) ==> \
\ [| [ lam x:A. b(x) = lam x:A. c(x) : A->B ] |]" ),
("apply_type",
"[| f: A->B |] ==> [| a: A |] ==> [| f`a : B |]" ),
("beta_conv",
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"[| a : A |] ==> (!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| b(x) : B |]) ==> \
\ [| [ (lam x:A.b(x)) ` a = b(a) : B ] |]" ),
("eta_conv", "[| f: A->B |] ==> [| [ lam x:A. f`x = f : A->B ] |]" ),
(** Products **)
("pair_type", "[| a: A |] ==> [| b: B |] ==> [| <a,b> : A*B |]" ),
("prod_elim",
"[| p : A*B |] ==> \
\ (!(x,y)[| x: A |] ==> [| y: B |] ==> [| Q(<x,y>) |]) ==> \
\ [| Q(p) |]" ),
("pair_inject",
"[| [ <a,b> = <c,d> : A*B ] |] ==> \
\ ([| [ a = c : A ] |] ==> [| [ b = d : B ] |] ==> [| R |]) ==> \
\ [| R |]" ),
(*fst and snd could be defined using descriptions...they are not to avoid
excessive type labels -- which is the point of defining products here. *)
("fst_type", "[| p: A*B |] ==> [| fst(p) : A |]" ),
("snd_type", "[| p: A*B |] ==> [| snd(p) : B |]" ),
("fst_conv", "[| a: A |] ==> [| b: B |] ==> [| [ fst(<a,b>) = a: A] |]" ),
("snd_conv", "[| a: A |] ==> [| b: B |] ==> [| [ snd(<a,b>) = b: B] |]" ),
("split_def", "split(p,f) == f(fst(p), snd(p))" ),
(** Subtypes **)
("subtype_intr", "[| a: A |] ==> [| P(a) |] ==> [| a : {x:A.P(x)} |]" ),
("subtype_elim1", "[| a: {x:A.P(x)} |] ==> [| a:A |]"),
("subtype_elim2", "[| a: {x:A.P(x)} |] ==> [| P(a) |]"),
(** Natural numbers **)
("Zero_type", "[| 0: nat |]" ),
("Succ_type", "[| a: nat |] ==> [| Succ(a) : nat |]" ),
("rec_type",
"[| a : nat |] ==> \
\ [| b : C |] ==> \
\ (!(x,y)[| x: nat |] ==> [| y: C |] ==> [| c(x,y): C |]) ==> \
\ [| rec(a,b,c) : C |]" ),
("rec_congr",
"[| [ a = a' : nat ] |] ==> \
\ [| [ b = b' : C ] |] ==> \
\ (!(x,y)[| x: nat |] ==> [| y: C |] ==> \
\ [| [ c(x,y) = c'(x,y): C ] |]) ==> \
\ [| [ rec(a,b,c) = rec(a',b',c') : C ] |]" ),
("rec_conv0",
"[| b: C |] ==> \
\ (!(x,y)[| x: nat |] ==> [| y: C |] ==> [| c(x,y): C |]) ==> \
\ [| [ rec(0,b,c) = b : C ] |]" ),
("rec_conv1",
"[| a : nat |] ==> \
\ [| b : C |] ==> \
\ (!(x,y)[| x: nat |] ==> [| y: C |] ==> [| c(x,y): C |]) ==> \
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\ [| [ rec(Succ(a),b,c) = c(a, rec(a,b,c)) : C ] |]" ),
("nat_induct",
"[| a: nat |] ==> [| Q(0) |] ==> \
\ (!(x)[| x: nat |] ==> [| Q(x) |] ==> [| Q(Succ(x)) |]) ==> \
\ [| Q(a) |]" ),
(*** Logic ***)
(** Implication and quantification *)
("classical", "([| ~P |] ==> [| P |]) ==> [| P |]"),
("imp_intr",
"([| P |] ==> [| Q |]) ==> [| P-->Q |]"),
("mp",
"[| P-->Q |] ==> [| P |] ==> [| Q |]"),
("all_intr",
"(!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| P(x) |]) ==> [| ALL x:A.P(x) |]"),
("spec",
"[| ALL x:A.P(x) |] ==> [| a : A |] ==> [| P(a) |]"),
(** Reflection *)
("term_type", "[| term(P) : bool |]" ),
("term_conv", "[| p: bool |] ==> [| [ term(form(p)) = p : bool ] |]" ),
("form_intr", "[| P |] ==> [| form(term(P)) |]"),
("form_elim", "[| form(term(P)) |] ==> [| P |]"),
("term_congr",
"([| P |] ==> [| Q |]) ==> ([| Q |] ==> [| P |]) ==> \
\ [| [ term(P) = term(Q) : bool ] |]"),
(** Reduction predicate for simplification. *)
(*does not verify a:A! Sound because only trans_red uses a Reduce premise*)
("refl_red", "Reduce(a,a)" ),
("red_if_equal", "[| [ a = b : A ] |] ==> Reduce(a,b)"),
("trans_red", "[| [ a = b : A ] |] ==> Reduce(b,c) ==> [| [ a = c : A ] |]"),
(** Definitions of other connectives*)
("False_def", "False == term(ALL p:bool.form(p))"),
("True_def", "True == term(ALL p:bool.form(p)-->form(p))"),
("conj_def", "P&Q == ALL r:bool. (P-->Q-->form(r)) --> form(r)"),
("disj_def",
"P|Q == ALL r:bool. (P-->form(r)) --> (Q-->form(r)) --> form(r)"),
("exists_def",
"(EXISTS x:A. P(x)) == ALL r:bool. (ALL x:A. P(x)-->form(r)) --> form(r)"),
("not_def", "~P == (P-->form(False))"),
("iff_def", "P<->Q == (P-->Q) & (Q-->P)"),
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(** Conditionals *)
("cond_def", "cond(A,p,a,b) == PICK x:A.(form(p) & [x=a:A]) | \
\ (~form(p) & [x=b:A])" ),
(** Descriptions *)
("Pick_type", "[| EXISTS x:A.P(x) |] ==> [| (PICK x:A.P(x)) : A |]"),
("Pick_congr",
"(!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| P(x) <-> Q(x) |]) ==> \
\ [| EXISTS x:A.P(x) |] ==> [| [ PICK x:A.P(x) = PICK x:A.Q(x) : A ] |]"),
("Pick_intr", "[| EXISTS x:A.P(x) |] ==> [| P(PICK x:A.P(x)) |]"),
(** Definitions of Classes*)
("member_def", "a<:S == form(S`a)"),
("subset_def", "subset(A,S,T) == ALL z:A. z<:S --> z<:T"),
("un_def", "un(A,S,T) == lam z:A. term(z<:S | z<:T)"),
("int_def", "int(A,S,T) == lam z:A. term(z<:S & z<:T)"),
("union_def",
"union(A,F) == lam z:A. term(EXISTS S:A->bool. S<:F & z<:S)"),
("inter_def",
"inter(A,F) == lam z:A. term(ALL S:A->bool. S<:F --> z<:S)"),
("pow_def",
"pow(A,S) == lam T:A. term(subset(A,T,S))"),
(** Definitions of types*)
(*the types "void" and "unit"*)
("void_def", "void == {p: bool. form(False)}"),
("unit_def", "unit == {p: bool. [p=True:bool]}"),
(*unions: the type A+B *)
("plus_def",
"A+B == {w: (A->bool) * (B->bool). \
\ (EXISTS x:A. [w = Inl(A,B,x) : (A->bool) * (B->bool)]) | \
\ (EXISTS y:B. [w = Inr(A,B,y) : (A->bool) * (B->bool)]) }"),
("Inl_def", "Inl(A,B,a) == <lam x:A.term([ a = x : A ]), lam y:B.False>"),
("Inr_def", "Inr(A,B,b) == <lam x:A.False, lam y:B.term([ b = y : B ])>"),
("when_def",
"when(A,B,C,p,c,d) == PICK z:C. \
\ (ALL x:A. [ p = Inl(A,B,x) : A+B ] --> [ z = c(x) : C ]) & \
\ (ALL y:B. [ p = Inr(A,B,y) : A+B ] --> [ z = d(y) : C ])" )];
end;
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